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**The Issues of Memory and The State**  
**A Critical Analysis of the Holocaust**  
**Memorial Project,**  
**Hyde Park, London**

During the period 1933-1938, the British government resolved to limit public criticism of Germany's internal affairs, by which was meant the persecution of German Jews, by not wishing to 'isolate Germany from the international community or lead it to withdraw from the League of Nations...' should Britain become too enthusiastic or involved in the plight of German Jewish refugees escaping the Nazis<sup>1</sup>. This potential 'obstacle to Anglo-German relationships...' was not to be overemphasised in public. Louise London, in her text *Whitehall and the Jews* (2000) refers to an attempt on 12<sup>th</sup> April 1933, by Foreign Office officials, to withhold from the public, ambassadorial dispatches detailing German persecution of certain groups including intellectuals, handicapped children, trade unionists, Communists, Social Democrats and of course Jews<sup>2</sup>. The very next day however, and on cabinet approval, Sir John Simon voiced disquiet over such persecution, London continues.

Despite the reticence to declare that one of Britain's European neighbours was exercising brutal forms of anti-Semitism, Britain could not escape the fact that even its own citizens were becoming enmeshed in Nazi racist abuse. In April 1933 British directors of Anglo-Persian Oil (now British Petroleum) asked the Foreign Office if the government had any objections to them retiring Jewish directors of their German sales subsidiary. This was on the premise that 'sales would suffer and Nazi employers would become insubordinate if the board retained its Jewish employees...'<sup>3</sup>. The government declined to intercede and left it to the company to decide its course of action. It retired the directors and even after an appeal from

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<sup>1</sup> Louise London, *Whitehall and the Jews*, (University Press, Cambridge 2000), pp33-4

<sup>2</sup> Louise London, p. 32

<sup>3</sup> Louise London, p. 34

within parliament from a Jewish MP for re-instatement, the Government declined to get involved.

London's book is concerned with the treatment of Jewish refugees during the period 1933-1945. 'In many ways', states London, 'its focus is on the host community rather than the refugee experience' since this provides an important insight into 'not only a chapter of the history of the Jews', but also an understanding of 'the British response to it', which London claims 'are necessary starting points for an understanding of British values'<sup>4</sup>. In so doing, our response to others aids us to understand ourselves.

This essay is not about Jewish refugees though, and it is not about the Holocaust per se. It is a critique vis-à-vis the Holocaust Memorial in Hyde Park, London. This may automatically trigger different meanings to different individuals, whether they are representing themselves or are acting as part of a community. It is *meaning* that I wish to investigate through this, from the project's conception in 1979 through its embryonic beginnings to its physical and cultural reality during 1983. I.e. meaning in relation to the sponsors with having the need and the British Government, the authority to sanction such a project. My preferred method of research is the 'bottom-up' approach, searching out 'related' documentation that might have a bearing on the analysis and any eventual conclusions. As my endeavours were also motivated by the notion of the 'History of Ideas' and to a great extent by Michel Foucault's *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, I have attempted to apply the rules that Foucault specified in that volume, first published in 1969<sup>5</sup>.

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<sup>4</sup> Louise London, p. 15

<sup>5</sup> Michel Foucault, *Archaeology of Knowledge*, (Routledge, London 2002)

Furthermore, William J. Bowsma's notion that we should consider a 'History of Meaning' rather than the outdated 'History of Ideas' strikes me as a compelling alternative for a twenty first century approach<sup>6</sup>. *Meaning* which could be considered irreducible, and we may never be able to pose the question 'what's the meaning of meaning'; whereas one could justifiably ask the question 'what is the *meaning* of idea'.

The first task was to assign a 'very precisely defined series' of texts in order to provide 'sufficiently homogeneous discursive fields' with the end result of producing *meaning* related to this specific series only<sup>7</sup>. In this way, Foucault's Archaeology opposes the more traditional *History of Ideas* by ignoring 'beginnings and endings' and does not attempt to fit discursive events into a wider sphere of discourse and relating them to tradition, prior knowledge or beliefs and making them 'what they are not'<sup>8</sup>. This is problematic according to Toews, in as much as 'discursive performances' should remain autonomous, if one is to 'engage seriously in a discourse with Foucault..<sup>9</sup>. Relating multiple texts would also require one to attempt to ignore the bigger picture however bright that picture's screen may flicker. If I could have ignored the Holocaust it would have been as pleasing to me as ignoring Plato! But Foucault demands that the texts have a certain '..externally defined unity'<sup>10</sup>.

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<sup>6</sup> John E. Toews, 'Intellectual History after the Linguistic Turn: The Autonomy of Meaning and the Irreducibility of Experience', *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 92, No.4 (Oct., 1987), p. 879

<sup>7</sup> Michel Foucault, p.160

<sup>8</sup> Michel Foucault, p.154

<sup>9</sup> John E. Toews, p. 890

<sup>10</sup> Mark Poster, 'The Future According to Foucault: *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, and Intellectual History', *Modern European Intellectual History*, LaCapra, Kaplan (Ed.), (Cornell, Intaca 1982), , p147

In Foucault's work, texts from Eighteenth Century Medicine might have sufficed by way of example. The unity associating texts in *this* analysis might easily concern the Holocaust. Already, I cannot avoid the reference to a possible beginning! In the end it was not a complex problem in finding a series of texts from the National Archives (NA) at Kew that related HM Government involvement in things associated with the Holocaust. In fact, I found that these texts 'fitted' before I ever allied them to anything that Foucault would have dictated. I was satisfied that there was sufficient common ground on which to discuss the Holocaust as an idea as it manifested itself from within the body of text. The texts are introduced below:

The first text relates directly to the Memorial project and consists of communications during the period 1979 – 1983, both internally between HM Government departments, the Cabinet, etc. and externally with the sponsors<sup>11</sup>.

The second text relates to an apparently public Foreign Office 'blunder' when the then British Consulate to Poland snubbed an invitation to the opening of a new Holocaust memorial at Auschwitz during 1967<sup>12</sup>.

To complete the second task, Foucault would want to bracket unities within each body of text. These may have been offered up by the authors, the general public or anyone else. In this analysis this presents a plethora of available notions including the memorial, the public monuments, the concept of truth and lies, collective and individual will, etc. I have identified 'Memory and the State' as promising unities for discussion. From this I can seek out Foucault's 'recurrent...statements' and arrive at

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<sup>11</sup> National Archives, File WORK 17/795/250496

<sup>12</sup> National Archives, File FO/371/166152 and FILE FO/371/159492

defining them 'in themselves' and not be swept aside by some long-established 'historical phenomenology of mind' as Poster postulates<sup>13</sup>.

According to an NA file released prior to the normal 30 years rule, the Rt. Hon Graville Janner MP, met with Michael Heseltine, the newly appointed Secretary of State for the Environment in Margaret Thatcher's 1979 Conservative Government. Meeting in the British Houses of Parliament, they discussed the possibility of a Nazi Holocaust memorial being established in central London<sup>14</sup>. Janner, acting in his capacity as President of The Board of Deputies of British Jews (BDBJ), later confirmed in writing that this would be 'a tribute, a reminder and a memorial to... 11 million murdered people of perhaps which 6 million were Jews and 5 million non-Jews'. Janner continued that the project would be under the aegis of the BDBJ and The Council for Christians and Jews (CCJ) and a project committee headed by Sir Sigmund Sternberg together with an artistic committee headed by Baroness Birk would be formed. Janner hoped that the project would also entertain Royal and other distinguished patronage. Additionally, he refers to U.S. President Clinton's parallel efforts to establish a Holocaust memorial in Washington D.C.

It was now apparently left to the Secretary of State (SS) to 'find a site very quickly.' for consideration and announcement by 3<sup>rd</sup> September 1979, the 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the outbreak of war. Janner's stipulations were for a site 'not far from the Cenotaph...one visible from afar', so as not to be subjected to damage by vandals. A riverside or park site were also his preferred alternatives.

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<sup>13</sup> Mark Poster, p148

<sup>14</sup> National Archives, copy BDBJ letter Janner to Heseltine dated 16th July 1979, File WORK 17/795/250496

Heseltine then instigated an internal investigation that initially identified 4 sites for consideration. A.J. Kaye, Department of Ancient Monuments and Historic Buildings (DAMHB) wrote to SS office offering the following

‘A site adjacent to the Cenotaph at 85 Whitehall which might provide a suitable memorial as an integral part of the wall of a proposed building for this position<sup>15</sup>.

The site of the *Burghers of Calais* Memorial in Victoria Tower Gardens, which was under review for removal to the Tate museum, having sustained some damage and being a Rodin statue, was therefore a valuable asset.’

Alternatively,

‘the site being the southern-most part of Victoria Tower Gardens adjacent to Lambeth Bridge.

A new site near to the junction of Victoria Street and Tothill Street, although its present ownership was still to be established.’

Kaye continued that a Royal Park site was not a preferred alternative due to the ‘...amount of [statues and memorials] already there’. At this point Kaye was recommended to involve The Fine Arts Commission (FAC) for comment and after some trouble contacting them had spoken to a Mr Piper in Oxford having been referred to him by FAC. Piper evidently concerned himself with the possibility that the

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<sup>15</sup> National Archives, DAMHB memoranda from Kaye to Preston SpS1 dated 26<sup>th</sup> July 1979 and 6<sup>th</sup> September 1979, File WORK 17/795/250496

Memorial 'might take an ostentatious form' and was also 'fiercely against a site proposed by Janner in telephone conversation with Preston adjacent to the Jewel House and 'was not much enamoured...[by]...Victoria Tower Gardens'. Piper in fact, preferred a site 'well away from Westminster...such as Kenwood' although he did additionally suggest a riverside site adjacent to Lambeth Palace.

Heseltine replied to Janner and eventually proposed two sites: 85 Whitehall and the riverside site adjacent to Lambeth Palace, the former site calling for 'very simple, restrained treatment'<sup>16</sup>.

Janner accepted the first site claiming it to be the 'unanimous view of us all...[this site is]...the finest which could have been provided' and offered to set about commissioning an aptly simple design<sup>17</sup>. Janner also asks for permission to announce this decision on 21<sup>st</sup> October 1979.

The Daily Telegraph announces a new 'Whitehall Memorial To 11 m[illion]' on 22<sup>nd</sup> October 1979 being built opposite the Cenotaph and that Janner stressed no public funds would be involved<sup>18</sup>.

In the meantime, the DCA learn of the forthcoming memorial by a 'circulatory route' at the Whitehall site that was being developed for them by Property Services Agency (PSA)<sup>19</sup>. They complained to SS office that they had not been consulted adding that a Memorial could not be forthcoming before the mid-1980's and that as the Foreign

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<sup>16</sup> National Archive, DOE letter from Heseltine to Janner dated 20<sup>th</sup> September 1979, File WORK 17/795/250496

<sup>17</sup> National Archives, BDBJ letter from Janner to Heseltine dated 11<sup>th</sup> October 1979, File WORK 17/795/250496

<sup>18</sup> National Archives, Copy of article, File WORK 17/795/250496

<sup>19</sup> National Archives, Not sure who this is but not expecting it to be Dept. of Constitutional Affairs



Office is probably occupying the building, their opinion should also have been sought<sup>20</sup>.

DAMHB writes to DCA suggesting that 'where there is a will there is a way' and 'that the design and installation...however simple...[would not in any circumstances be ]...a quick matter'<sup>21</sup>.

Clearly the will does not appear to be resident in the site developer's minds at this stage, having raised some awkward, if pertinent objections to the Memorial. Further correspondence in the file points to a site entrance for contractors which would be at the same point that the proposed Memorial would be erected; it therefore would have to be developed last and this fact had justified the mid-1980's timeframe.

At a later meeting between Lady Birk for BDBJ and Government officials, Birk accepts an alternative site further up Whitehall on the north side of Richmond Terrace and that a few simple stones might be laid and that one of these might be provided by Israel<sup>22</sup>. Request for maintenance costs were also discussed and that the simpler the site the lower the costs 'permitting a more positive and useful memorial...possibly an educational centre...to be established elsewhere'.

DCA are still not happy concerning the positioning of the memorial in Whitehall. They again ask if it will be acceptable to the Foreign office (FCO) and in addition to the Ministry of Defence (MOD), in that it is directly opposite the proposed Memorial

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<sup>20</sup> National Archive, DCA memorandum Johnson to Mendoza, dated 22<sup>nd</sup> October 1979, WORK17/795/250496

<sup>21</sup> National Archives, DAMHB memorandum from Kaye to Clubley, DCA, dated 29<sup>th</sup> October 1979, File WORK17/795/250496

<sup>22</sup> National Archives, DAMHB minutes dated 3<sup>rd</sup> January 1980 DCA, DAMHB and BDBJ present, File WORK17/795/250496

suggesting that the 'Foreign Office attitudes and British involvement in Palestine are surely not totally irrelevant'<sup>23</sup>. Also, that public pedestrian access would be legal, but not encouraged at present. Oddly, in this memorandum Holmes makes reference to a fact that the position might best be resolved if the proposal is 'presented as an inter-denominational one', suggesting that although that had already been indicated by Janner in previous communications, it needed greater emphasis.

Clubley's reply is to the point. 'I may be wrong but I sense a general antipathy in DCA towards the proposed Memorial.' to which Holmes retorts that there was no antipathy, but more of a concern about the site for it<sup>2425</sup>.

The Foreign Office (Lord Peter Carrington) was eventually consulted, asking whether there was any FO objection 'to having a Holocaust Memorial in this country at all', apparently having received doubts from the Secretary for State for Defence (Francis Pym) that the country did not want such a Memorial<sup>2627</sup>. Carrington did not object in principle, but also opposed the Richmond Terrace site. Carrington suggested that No. 10 might be consulted in this respect.

It must have been clear to all in SS that this was going to be a non-starter given the objections received from the MOD, FO and the DCA.

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<sup>23</sup> National Archives, DCA memorandum from Holmes to Clubley, DAMHB dated 21<sup>st</sup> January 1980, File WORK17/795/250496

<sup>24</sup> National Archives, DAMHB memorandum from Clubley to Holmes, DCA dated 30<sup>th</sup> January 1980, File WORK17/795/250496

<sup>25</sup> National Archives, DCA memorandum Holmes to Clubley, DAMHB dated 21<sup>st</sup> February 1980, File WORK17/795/250496

<sup>26</sup> National Archives, memorandum from Horson, SPS to Jacobs APS/SS dated 19<sup>th</sup> May 1980, File WORK17/795/250496

<sup>27</sup> This correspondence is not present in the file and requires further research to establish the exact wording from MOD

The communications now start to refer to finding an alternative site for it. In this respect, the site in Lambeth remained an option and sites in Green Park, Hyde Park and Eaton Square are proposed. At this point the notion of a garden of remembrance is suggested by Hobson<sup>28</sup>.

In addition, a site in an East End park is mentioned as the East End 'is an appropriate place for a memorial of this nature' and suggesting that a playground might be a suitable alternative as 'more sociably useful', even though a bit light-hearted for such 'a sombre memory'. The other alternative would be a site outside London and Coventry was proposed because it had 'badly suffered from air raids'. Hobson also hints that these matters 'are all so personal' as he had 'discovered from discussions with colleagues'. He puts it firmly back in the SS court by suggesting that he [SS] should decide on what 'he himself would like to do and what form of monument he would think appropriate'.

In a second working of this memorandum, Hobson keeps all the alternatives, but adds that maybe the East End is not as suitable for the Jewish community as first thought since 'although some Jews have nostalgic emotions about Whitechapel and Mile End, most were glad to escape from there at the first opportunity' and then adds Plymouth to his list of out of London alternatives<sup>29</sup>.

Correspondence continues in very much the same manner till Heseltine met Janner again in November 1980. Janner wrote to him accepting the non-availability of Richmond Terrace but a 'Garden of Remembrance to the six million Jews killed' was

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<sup>28</sup> National Archives, SS draft memorandum by Hobson to PS/SS dated 23<sup>rd</sup> September 1980, File WORK17/795/250496

<sup>29</sup> National Archives, SS draft memorandum by Hobson to PS/SS dated 30<sup>th</sup> September 1980, File WORK17/795/250496

acceptable as an alternative, especially if it could be in St James's Park and consist of a Flame of Remembrance<sup>30</sup>. Draft replies indicated objections on controversial grounds concerning St James's Park being an integral part of Buckingham Palace. Heseltine's reply in December states St James's being too small and a flame would be open to vandalism. Hyde Park and Green Park remain as alternatives for consideration. Heseltine's reply also mentions a requirement for a payment 'in perpetuity towards maintenance'<sup>31</sup>.

Janner accepts an invitation to visit Hyde Park and attends with colleagues Sabitt and Lucas. From minutes of the site meeting it is reported that Janner wanted 37 stones representing each concentration camp together with a central meeting area<sup>32</sup>. Apparently Janner and his colleagues also 'looked rather glum at the thought' of paying for the upkeep in perpetuity. Janner sends in some sketches which the government officials feel as too elaborate and if constructed could 'become a rallying place or a source of tension'<sup>33</sup>.

Subsequent internal communications point to the designs being rejected on both cost and being outside the remit of a notion of a Garden of Remembrance. BDBJ revise their ideas to 'an acceptable level' and by December 1982 all were in agreement to proceed<sup>34</sup>. After some further discussions concerning the site, the government were getting ready to announce a formal opening of the Garden on 27<sup>th</sup> June 1983. Controversy does not end here though. Internal SS correspondence

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<sup>30</sup> National Archives, BDBJ letter from Janner to Heseltine dated 24<sup>th</sup> November 1980, File WORK17/795/250496

<sup>31</sup> National Archives, SS letter Heseltine to Janner dated December 1980, File WORK17/795/250496

<sup>32</sup> National Archives, minutes taken by Hobson to SS/PS dated 10<sup>th</sup> February 1982, File WORK17/795/250496

<sup>33</sup> National Archives, PPCS memorandum from Strong to Kaye, DAMHB dated 6<sup>th</sup> July 1982 File WORK17/795/250496

<sup>34</sup> National Archives, DAMHB letter from Kaye to Seifert and Partners, dated 7<sup>th</sup> December 1982

shows concern over the length of a speech that the (new) SS was to give at the opening. It should 'be very short...because the Secretary of State was entering a very sensitive arena' and 'the least that could decently be said the better'<sup>35</sup>.

This briefing memorandum highlights to the new SS that Heseltine 'had not taken Cabinet colleagues entirely along with him'. Additionally, it provides an insight into the FO and MOD objections as having been 'likely to offend German and Arab colleagues and on the principle that such a site [Whitehall] should be reserved for purely British Memorials. It turns out that it was also Carrington that suggested a 'park, playing field or the like' and that the Memorial 'remains a delicate addition to a Royal Park'. This memorandum additionally suggests that SS be dissuaded from speaking at a lunch following the opening ceremony.

The remaining correspondence concerns the cleaning and the sealing of the Memorial stone at the centre of the Garden which had apparently been vandalised at some time between the opening and November 1983.

At this stage of an analysis it might be prudent to stand back and assess the results of the first pass as in an ordinary archaeological physical dig. Foucault referred to discursive fields as 'monuments' which is a difficult notion to explain. Taking the analogy of the 'dig', I feel I have performed a search of a 'first trench' only within the limits of discourse, namely, the two sets of files described above. To proceed, a 'second trench' is required at another 'site', in this case it being another timeframe and another place in the world.

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<sup>35</sup> National Archives, SS/PPCS from Butler to Strong and APS/SS

But what does my first trench reveal? My overriding feeling is the one of 'fear'. A fear of the 'other' and this is especially strong within the Government side of the equation. On the opposite side, I sensed firstly a sense of humbleness that turned quickly to victory, not because the Memorial was completed but because it was finished, in Janner's eyes anyway, as a solely Jewish project and not as the all-encompassing inter-denominational variety of the original idea. I sense that was his intention all along, although there is no proof of the matter. The evidence for this might be the change in tone to Janner's original correspondence from a site to commemorate 11 million souls in Whitehall to one of 6 million Jews in Hyde Park. But I must complete the analysis before I overstate any conclusions. Archaeologists are prone to do this all the time.

Let us test the second event.

In 1967 the British Government got itself involved in more than a small amount of adverse international and UK press coverage over a Holocaust Memorial. It relates to the unveiling of a Memorial at Auschwitz on 16<sup>th</sup> April 1967. The Ambassador to Poland, Thomas Brimelow, dispatched a note to FO London seeking advice as to whether he should attend the opening ceremony<sup>3637</sup>. He had received an invitation from the 'Organising Committee' for the Memorial. Relating this Committee to an original 1961 Organising Committee, with communist persuasions, his preference was to decline the invitation<sup>38</sup>. This was based on intelligence reports on the make-up of some of the new Committee members. Additionally, the invitation had not come

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<sup>36</sup> Lord Brimelow (1915 –1995)

<sup>37</sup> National Archives, Note to London from Brimelow to Northern Office, File: FCO/28/303

<sup>38</sup> National Archives, The British Government had been approached in 1961 for a contribution towards the construction of a Holocaust Memorial at Auschwitz. The 'Comité International d'Auschwitz had close links with 'known front organisations, especially 'International Federation of Resistance Fighters (FIR). HM Government declined to contribute as did most NATO governments. File: FO/371/166152

from the Polish Government, in whose country the memorial would reside, and it was thought that it might also upset the West German Government. The worry was also that the occasion would be used to denigrate the West and especially the FDR. This is, after all, occurring at the height of Cold War.

London agrees and Brimelow stays away from the event. In following communications with London it becomes apparent that much adverse press was forthcoming as the British Government had not been represented whilst Japan, Italy, India and evidently 'the entire Western Alliance came, alone Britain did not'<sup>39</sup>. Brimelow then sought out the impressions of the other Ambassadors that had attended and the consensus was that they had not been treated very kindly by the Organisers. The Israeli Ambassador in particular 'was indignant because the speakers minimised the fact that the purpose of Auschwitz had been to exterminate Jews'. In fact, the speech *had* been recorded by *Le Monde* journalists and playback confirmed that a paragraph had been included about Jewish victims. The Polish television station had edited out this paragraph in a broadcast to the Polish public only and this is what the Israeli ambassador had been basing his complaint.

The main part of the speech was directed as predicted by Brimelow at 'those who kill children and women by means of mass destruction, those who devastate the villages and towns of the heroic Vietnamese people'. The HM and US Government's party line to the public was that it was simply that the invitation had not come from the Polish government. Staff from the *Journal of the Association of Jewish Ex-*

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<sup>39</sup> Group Captain Leonard Cheshire, An open letter to *The Times* dated 24<sup>th</sup> April 1967. The Group Captain had attended the event

*Servicemen and Women* however, had been offered an explanation at a private meeting at the FO. No record exists of this meeting in these files.

Performing the same initial assessment as before, it becomes clear that political expedience overrode every other, and especially humanitarian consideration in the ideological-led Cold War Europe of 1967. Certain other intelligence-related facts could also not be divulged and therefore the public were left with the opportunity to draw their own conclusions.

In this analysis I have established some basic facts concerning two historical events. Both events relate to the Holocaust in their own ways. But, they also relate to Memorials as culturally aesthetic objects. My discourse could have been on either but my chosen *unity* was in the form of Memory and The State and that Holocaust is the overriding substance of each texts. My 'trenches' then have guided me to establish that I have been excavating within the boundaries of a discourse that is the Holocaust. In much the same way, an archaeologist might excavate the fields and ashes of Auschwitz camp and make trenches at sites within the physical boundaries that suits their needs.

But can I find a common unity across my trenches? I have already stated that there is common ground within both texts to suit my purposes. What then might be unique in my discursive fields that sets them apart from beginnings or endings and what are my recurrent statements? This is the hardest part of my analysis. To stray from the constrictions of a Foucauldian analysis is a mighty large temptation and there are persuasive factors to do just that. Not least is the fact that Foucault admitted that *The Archaeology of Knowledge* was an unfinished project and by implication it should be regarded as work-in-progress. That also implies that my tool-set is incomplete and



that I cannot justify an analysis on this basis. Can one excavate the fields of Auschwitz without trowels and geo-physics? This is exactly what I will attempt.

The *idea* of the Holocaust Memorial for London depended on who was asking the question. Janner's and BDBJ's views were considerably different from the Government officials that became involved. The major statement that comes from the dialogues within the Hyde Park text is heavily disguised by rhetorical interventions of individuals and communities. 'Upsetting the Germans' neatly covers up the MOD Secretary of State's obvious distaste for a Holocaust Memorial under any circumstances, believing it had nothing to do with Britain and should not be constructed here. But, German sensitivity was also a major factor in HM Government's decision not to go to the opening of the Auschwitz memorial in 1967. Is the unity of statement then diplomacy? I think not. I believe that an alternative would be the desire not to remember or not be forced to remember by not accepting such a Memorial in the heart of Government.

Lord Brimelow was known as a hard-liner when it came to the ideological differences of East/West relationships. Facing adverse speeches by Polish ideologists would not have scared him in the least. It would in fact have provided the perfect opportunity for some informal intelligence gathering. The excuse given both internally and publicly were weak and Brimelow was avoiding Auschwitz. Although outside the scope of this essay, one might want to look at the alleged 'forced repatriation' of Russian and non-Russian refugees after the Second World War in which Brimelow took not a minor role<sup>40</sup>.

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<sup>40</sup> See article by Tim Rayment, *Sunday Times*, 'The Massacre and The Minister', 7<sup>th</sup> April 1996. See also *Lord Brimelow Papers*, @ [ibwww.essex.ac.uk/Archives/Brimelow.htm](http://ibwww.essex.ac.uk/Archives/Brimelow.htm).

Janner's and the BDBJ's persistence in their aims is admirable in remarkably difficult circumstances. They never got the Memorial for which they had hoped, but I suspect that they were more than a little shocked when a site just 20 metres away from the Cenotaph had been offered them as the first choice by the Government. I do also suspect that the final site in Hyde Park was a disappointment to the sponsors and that this shows in the unconscious reference to the Hyde Park site as a memory to the 6 million Jews only. A possible statement of self-interest may span the two texts, both personal and collective. British State self-interest is nothing new and forms a major foundation of all states. Louise London has alluded to it in her volume *Whitehall and the Jews* and it is this I find the most overwhelming Foucauldian statement to make concerning these texts. However, that is not unique to these texts and makes it difficult to fit with Foucault. In any event, I have sampled only a small portion of that which is referred to as the Holocaust. One could keep adding texts till a uniqueness might appear across the whole discourse.

I feel that Foucault would want his followers to find new statements and maybe by so doing progress our understanding of ourselves. New meanings to the Holocaust as an idea rather than a subject are in any case, much overdue from both an historical and contemporary viewpoint. What the Holocaust means to us today is equally as important as what it meant to Heseltine, Janner, the modern German nation or the survivors and their heirs. Foucault's methodology provides an opportunity to test our understanding within the bounds of knowledge without recourse to beginnings. What does knowledge alone do other than allow the luxury of saying 'I know so I am clever'. What Foucault might want us to ask is 'I understand so I am a better person'.

**End Note:**

If this archaeology is incomplete then it also utilises outdated terminology. A twenty-first century approach might allow us to change some of the terms and maybe complete his tool-set.

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**FCO/28/303** Communications regarding the opening ceremony of a Holocaust Memorial at Auschwitz

**WORK 17/795/250496** Communications relating to the establishment of a Holocaust Memorial in Hyde Park, London

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## Other selected reading

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